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I.  INTRODUCTION 
To what extent should fairness considerations drive energy policy?  
This basic question underlies much of the current debate over the net 
metering programs and related policies that have propelled record growth 
in the rooftop solar industry over the past decade.  Utilities are increasingly 
calling for reforms to these programs, claiming that they are unfair in one 
way or another. 
Fairness is a notoriously fuzzy concept capable of describing a wide 
range of distinct policy ideals.  Unless they are properly managed, general 
claims of unfairness can thus confuse and distract decision-makers in their 
attempts to address complicated regulatory challenges.  In light of these 
risks, how should policymakers respond to the various fairness arguments 
arising in the ongoing struggle over disruptive innovation in the nation’s 
energy sector? 
This Article analyzes the primary fairness arguments that utilities are 
leveling against net metering programs and electricity rate designs as 
rooftop solar energy expands across the country.  By categorizing and more 
thoroughly evaluating these arguments, this Article seeks to enhance the 
dialogue between utilities, legislators, state regulators, and the solar 
energy industry over how to best orchestrate the nation’s shift toward 
more sustainable electricity strategies. 
Part II of this Article describes how net metering programs and other 
factors are spurring dramatic growth in distributed solar energy generation 
in the United States and how utilities are increasingly lobbying for policy 
changes that would slow this trend.  Part III highlights the conspicuous 
role that simple fairness arguments are playing in utilities’ campaigns against 
distributed energy-friendly policies.  Part III also describes research by 
Professor Steven Shavell and Professor Louis Kaplow that questions the 
propriety of fairness arguments in policy analysis.  Shavell and Kaplow 
argue that claims of unfairness can be counterproductive distractions in 
the formulation of policy and thus recommend that decision-makers 
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thoroughly examine fairness-based arguments before allowing them to 
shape legislative, regulatory, or judicial decisions.  Part IV of this Article 
seeks to apply these scholars’ approach, analyzing fairness-based arguments 
against net metering and existing rate designs as they relate to three distinct 
groups:  (i) utility customers who have no solar panels, (ii) utility customers 
with low incomes, and (iii) utilities themselves. 
This Article ultimately argues that general appeals to fairness are 
detrimental in policy debates involving distributed solar energy.  Shunning 
fairness arguments in favor of clearer, more specific arguments would 
benefit decision-makers as they search for solutions to the complex policy 
challenges associated with transitioning to a more sustainable electricity 
system. 
II.  DISTRIBUTED SOLAR ENERGY: UTILITIES’ EXISTENTIAL THREAT? 
Throughout much of the United States today, rooftop solar energy 
installations have become a sound financial investment for real property 
owners.  Falling prices for photovoltaic (“PV”) solar panels1 and various 
government incentive programs2 have vaulted rooftop solar energy from 
a small niche industry into a booming business in many regions of the 
country.3 
A.  The Powerful Effects of Net Metering 
Net metering programs have arguably been more effective than any 
other type of policy at promoting the growth of distributed solar energy in 
 
 1.  See Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean a 
Death Spiral for Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 1, 5 (2014) (noting that “PV systems 
present increasingly viable alternatives to conventional retail electric utility service in parts 
of the United States”) (citing Black & Veatch, 2013 Strategic Direction in the U.S. Electric 
Utility Industry 42–43 (2013). 
 2.  For an exhaustive compilation of links to state incentive programs and policies 
relating to solar energy, visit the U.S. Department of Energy’s DSIRE Solar Portal at http:// 
www.dsireusa.org/solar/. 
 3.  For information on the dramatic growth of solar energy over the past several 
years, see GTM Research & Solar Energy Industries Association, Solar Market Insight Report 
(2014 Q1), http://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-market-insight-report-2014-q1 
(“The U.S. installed 1,330 MWdc of solar PV in Q1 2014, up 79% over Q1 2013, making 
it the second-largest quarter for solar installations in the history of the market”). 
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the United States.4  Although net metering programs vary across jurisdictions, 
most of them essentially provide that, when a customer’s distributed 
energy system generates more power than the customer needs on site, that 
extra electricity flows onto the grid and the customer’s meter effectively 
runs backward.5  In most jurisdictions, net-metered customers get credits 
from their utility at retail electricity rates for excess power that their 
distributed energy systems generate.6  Such customers thus typically pay 
only for whatever quantity of power they consumed during a month or 
year that exceeded what their renewable energy systems produced over 
that period. 
For obvious reasons, net metering programs significantly lower the 
electricity bills of utility customers with rooftop PV systems.  Particularly 
in sunny markets where retail electricity rates are high, these potential cost 
savings are beginning to make purchasing a solar array an attractive 
financial investment.  In these markets, distributed PV is rapidly reaching 
“grid parity” with conventional electricity sources—a degree of cost-
competitiveness that solar energy advocates only dreamed about just a few 
short years ago.7  Solar leasing and special financing arrangements are 
even allowing citizens who cannot afford to pay cash for rooftop PV systems 
to go solar with little or no money down.8  In light of these developments, 
it is hardly surprising that solar arrays are appearing on more and more 
rooftops across the country. 
B.  Utilities’ Growing Campaign Against Net Metering Programs and 
Other Policies Favoring Rooftop Solar Energy 
As exciting as the rapid rise of distributed solar energy has been 
for companies within that industry, some utilities seem to take a less 
enthusiastic view of these changes.  As rooftop solar development 
 
 4.  See ABA Environment, Energy and Resources Law Energy and Resource 
Committee, Renewable, Alternative, and Distributed Energy Resources, 2013 ABA ENV’T 
ENERGY, & RESOURCES L.: YEAR IN REV. 264, 270 (2013) (stating that net metering was 
“still the primary policy driver supporting residential solar installations” in 2013) [hereinafter 
ABA Environment, Energy and Resources Law Energy and Resource Committee, Year in 
Review]. 
 5.  See Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing Barriers to 
Innovation on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1712, 1727 (2014) (describing the basics 
elements of most net metering programs). 
 6.  See Robert E. Curry, Jr., The Law of Unintended Consequences, 151 NO. 3 PUB. 
UTIL. FORT. 44, 47 (2013) (noting that, in “most jurisdictions,” a net metering customer’s 
meter runs “backward at the full, bundled retail rate”). 
 7.  See Giles Parkinson, Solar Grid Party in All 50 States by 2015, Predicts 
Deutsche Bank, CLEANTECHNICA.COM (Oct. 29, 2014), available at http://cleantechnica.com/ 
2014/10/29/solar-grid-parity-us-states-2016-says-deutsche-bank/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
 8.  See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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becomes more commonplace, it is likely to dampen demand for grid-
supplied power and thereby cut into utilities’ profits.9  Concerned about 
these and other impacts, a growing number of utilities have begun actively 
seeking to weaken or eliminate net metering programs within their 
territories.10 
1.  A Utility Death Spiral? 
From the perspective of regulated utilities, net metering and distributed 
energy technologies can represent a growing threat to the comfortable 
business model under which they have operated for decades.  Utilities’ 
concerns about the potential long-term consequences of net metering are 
often encapsulated in what has come to be known as the “death spiral” 
scenario.11  When only a tiny fraction of a utility’s customers have solar 
panels, most utilities can absorb these customers’ impacts on their finances 
and day-to-day operations. But as its quantity of solar-using, net-metered 
customers grows, a utility sells less and less power and its revenue stream 
begins to shrink. To compensate for this drop in revenue, utilities typically 
must petition to increase the per-unit price of the electricity they sell. 
Unfortunately, these rate increases only make the relative price of distributed 
solar energy seem more attractive to utility customers.  Additional customers 
 
 9.  See Christopher Martin, Solar to Reduce Utility Profits in Five Years, Fitch 
Says, BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-18/solar-
to-reduce-utility-profits-in-five-years-fitch-says.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (describing a 
recent study predicting that “[r]ooftop solar power and energy-efficiency programs will 
eat into utility revenue and profit margins and discourage investment in new transmission 
projects within five years”). 
 10.  For information on utilities’ recent efforts to reform net metering and rate designs in 
response to the growth of distributed solar energy, see infra notes 16–33 and accompanying 
text. 
 11.  The utility death spiral concept has been articulated in countless articles in 
recent years, only a few of which are listed here.  See Graffy & Kihm, supra note 1, at 2 (“The 
characterization of renewable energy innovations, such as rooftop solar as a . . .‘death 
spiral’ reflects an awareness that unconventional risks have emerged”); Diane Cardwell, 
On Rooftops, a Rival for Utilities, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/07/27/business/energy-environment/utilities-confront-fresh-threat-do-it-yourself- 
power.html?_r=0 (observing that, “as utilities put a heavier burden on fewer customers, it 
increases the appeal for them to turn their roofs over to solar panels,” and that “Utility 
executives call this a ‘death spiral’”); Liam Denning, Lights Flicker for Utilities, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2013) (describing Wall Street fears of a “looming ‘death spiral’” for 
utilities, “with solar power being the culprit”). 
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are thus enticed to get solar panels of their own, causing utilities to suffer 
even further revenue declines. 
As solar arrays appear on more and more rooftops within a given area, 
a utility’s daily task of balancing load supply and demand on the electricity 
grid also becomes more difficult.  In addition to ramping centralized 
power plants up or down in response to shifts in load demand, utilities 
operating in territories with large numbers of rooftop solar installations 
have to also predict and respond to changes in the amount of power that 
these systems supply into the grid.  Balancing loads in a grid with thousands 
of rooftop solar energy systems requires estimating how productive all of 
these customer-controlled systems will be at any given moment—a chore 
that can be particularly difficult on partly cloudy days when the amount 
and intensity of sunlight in a region is constantly in flux.12  Further rate 
increases are often the only feasible way for utilities to fund the expensive 
grid upgrades needed to address the new load management challenges 
associated with distributed solar power. Of course, rate increases aimed at 
covering these additional costs only motivate more customers to invest in 
their own solar arrays. 
This vicious cycle of declining utility revenues, rising electricity rates, 
and shrinking demand for grid-supplied power could theoretically spiral 
on and on until nearly every customer has rooftop solar panels or some 
other distributed energy system. At that point, electric utilities would 
devolve into mere suppliers of high-priced, temporary backup electricity.  
Retail rates for that backup power would have to be astronomically high 
for utilities to recoup their costs under such a model, so small-scale distributed 
energy storage or generators could likely become viable alternatives to 
reliance on utilities.13 Insolvent and devoid of customers, conventional 
utilities caught in such a world would quickly fade into extinction. 
 
 12.  The additional challenges that distributed energy generation place on grid load 
management are perhaps most famously illustrated through the California Independent 
System Operator’s description of a “duck curve” reflecting hour-by-hour variations in 
electricity supply and demand in California’s grid system.  See generally California ISO, 
Fast Facts: What the duck curve tells us about managing a green grid, available at 
http://www.caiso.com/Documents/FlexibleResourcesHelpRenewables_FastFacts.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (explaining how the rise of distributed energy sources creates 
“different operating conditions that require flexible resource capabilities to ensure green 
grid reliability”). 
 13.  There is evidence that the trend of utility customers leaving the grid is already 
beginning to gain steam in some markets.  See Mark Chediak, He Ripped their House Off 
the Grid, and He’s No Hippie, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29, 2014), available at http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-30/getting-off-the-grid-in-hawaii-becoming-a-family-affair. 
html (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (describing how small businesses in Hawaii are beginning 
to supply equipment and expertise to help residents leave the grid and noting that SolarCity 
Corp. and SunPower Corp. are offering solar and battery packages designed for that purpose 
as well). 
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2.  Proposals to Slow or Stop the Spiral 
Although the death spiral scenario just described is not likely to wipe 
out most utilities anytime soon, net metering programs and the growing 
rooftop solar energy industry are already whittling away at investor-owned 
utilities’ profits and complicating utilities’ operations in some jurisdictions.14  
Even in regions where solar panel installations are still relatively uncommon, 
utilities seem to increasingly view net metering and distributed solar energy 
as credible threats to their stability over the long term.  Accordingly, more 
and more utilities and their investors are now lobbying for reforms to net 
metering programs and rate designs that would decelerate the growth of 
distributed solar energy. 
One reform strategy that some utilities have recently proposed involves 
imposing special fees on utility customers that have solar panels.  For 
example, Arizona Public Service, Co. (“APS”), a large investor-owned 
utility in Arizona, asked regulators in that state in 2013 to allow the utility 
to impose fees of up to $100 per month on solar energy-using customers.15  
Utilities have lobbied for similar fees in Georgia,16 Idaho,17 Utah,18 
 
 14.  See supra note 9. 
 15.  See Ryan Randazzo, APS seeks higher bills for new solar customers, 
azcentral.com (July 12, 2013), available at http://www.azcentral.com/business/consumer/ 
free/20130712aps-seeks-higher-bills-new-solar-customers.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2014) 
(reporting that “Arizona Public Service Co. is proposing charging customers who install 
rooftop solar panels $50 to $100 or more a month to cover the cost of maintaining the 
power grid”). 
 16.  See Walter C. Jones, Georgia Power agrees to smaller rate increase, THE 
AUGUSTA CHRONICLE (Nov. 18, 2013), available at  http://chronicle.augusta.com/latest-
news/2013-11-18/georgia-power-agrees-smaller-rate-hike?v=1384802802 (last visited Oct. 
17, 2014) (describing Georgia Power’s decision to postpone its request for a monthly $22 
fee on solar energy-using customers). 
 17.  See Mark Jaffe, Rooftop solar net metering is being fought across U.S., THE 
DENVER POST (Sept. 1, 2013), available at http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_2398 
6631/rooftop-solar-net-metering-is-being-fought-across (last visited Oct. 17, 2014) (mentioning 
Idaho Power Co.’s proposal to quadruple the utility’s monthly service charge for rooftop 
solar homes). 
 18.  See Laura Seitz, Solar energy users claim victory as ‘sun tax’ rejected, DESERET 
NEWS (Aug. 30, 2014), available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865609848/Solar 
-energy-users-claim-victory-as-sun-tax-rejected.html?pg=all (last visited Sept. 23, 2014) 
(describing Rocky Mountain Power’s request for a $4.65 monthly fee on residential rooftop 
solar customers within its territory). 
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Virginia,19 Vermont,20  and Wisconsin.21  In most cases, these fees are 
intended to apply only to customers with net-metered, on-site distributed 
energy systems such as rooftop solar arrays. 
Thus far, it appears that Arizona is the only state in which a utility has 
begun actually imposing targeted fees on users of solar energy.  Under 
authorization from the Arizona Corporation Commission, APS now 
generally charges residential customers fees of $0.70 per kilowatt of 
installed PV generating capacity.22  For a typical 7-kilowatt solar array, 
this fee amounts to less than $5.00 per month.23  However, the Commission’s 
decision approving the fee specifies that APS customers whose solar arrays 
are installed after January 1, 2014, must be presented with a document 
stating that such fees could increase by any approved amount at any time.24  
This potential for future fee increases on solar users creates added uncertainty 
for customers in APS territory, and there is evidence that these reforms 
are already slowing the rate of distributed solar energy installations among 
APS customers.25  Salt River Project, another large Arizona utility, also 
recently announced plans to impose special fees on customers with solar 
energy systems.26 
 
 19.  See Mike Gangloff, Appalachian Power’s proposed fee targets uses of solar 
panels, ROANOKE TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), available at http://www.roanoke.com/news/local/ 
blacksburg/appalachian-power-s-proposed-fee-targets-users-of-solar-panels/article_16597740 
-c251-5c3a-99e9-135dc19ae42c.html. 
 20.  See Scott Gibson, Vermont Utility Seeks a New Solar Fee, GREENBUILDING 
ADVISOR.COM (Jul. 11, 2014), available at http://www.greenbuildingadvisor.com/blogs/dept/green 
-building-news/vermont-utility-seeks-new-solar-fee (last visited Oct. 17, 2014) (highlighting 
Washington Electric Cooperative’s proposal to charge a grid service fee of $0.463 cents 
per kilowatt hour for all new net metered customers within its service area). 
 21.  See Kiley Kroh, Push to Impose Extra Fees On Solar Customers Draws Outrage 
In Wisconsin, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Sept. 14, 2014, 11:46AM), http://thinkprogress.org/ 
climate/2014/09/14/3567244/utility-fees-end-wisconsin-solar/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) 
(describing a plan recently submitted by the Wisconsin Utility “We Energies” to impose a 
new monthly “demand charge” or $3.80 per kilowatt on owners of renewable energy systems). 
 22.  See Diane Cardwell, Compromise in Arizona Defers a Solar Fight, N.Y. TIMES  
(Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/business/energy-environment/compromise-
in-arizona-defers-a-solar-power-fight.html?_r=0. 
 23.  See id. 
 24.  See Ryan Randazzo, Commission votes to raise APS customers’ bills, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC  (Nov. 14, 2013, 10 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/bu siness/arizonaeconomy/ 
articles/20131114aps-solar-customer-bills-higher.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
 25.  See Press Release, Marta Stoepker & Will Greene, Solar Installations Drop 
After APS Assesses Charge to Solar Customers, SIERRACLUB.COM  (Apr. 14, 2014), http:// 
content.sierraclub.org/press-releases/2014/04/solar-installations-drop-after-aps-assesses-
charge-solar-customers (last visited Nov. 20, 2014) explaining that the quantityof rooftop 
solar energy installations in APS territory in the first quarter of 2014 was 40% lower than 
in the first quarter of 2014). 
 26.  See Ryan Randazzo, SRP’s proposed rate hike targets new rooftop-solar customers, 
AZCENTRAL.COM (Dec. 1, 2014, 4:03PM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/ 
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Proposals to reform utility rates in ways that increase the fixed portion 
of customers’ monthly bills have also become common in recent years and 
are similarly capable of curbing rooftop solar energy growth.  Electricity rates 
have historically been volumetric, meaning that the total amount that 
customers owe on their electricity bills is based primarily upon the quantity 
of electric power actually supplied to them over that billing period.27  
However, a growing number of utilities are now seeking to make utility 
rates less volumetric in nature.  For instance, in 2014, California’s legislature 
recently enacted a statute authorizing utilities to impose fixed fees of up 
to ten dollars28 and a utility in Wisconsin received state commission 
approval to increase its fixed monthly fee from nine dollars to sixteen 
dollars.29 
Unlike the solar-specific fees charged by APS, fixed customer fees are 
paid by all customers, regardless of whether they have solar panels.  
However, these fees can still weaken economic incentives for rooftop 
solar because they increase the amount that customers must pay even if 
they use no grid-supplied power over a given billing period.  Moreover, 
utilities tend to offset these large fixed fee increases with corresponding 
decreases in per-kWh rates so as to avoid steep overall rate increases.  
These reductions in the per-kWh price weaken customers’ incentives to 
conserve electricity or to make buildings more energy efficient—two of 




visited Dec. 3, 2014) (describing SRP’s proposed plan to impose fees of up to $50 per 
month on customers who add rooftop solar panels to their homes). 
 27.  See Jeff D. Mackholm, “Decoupling” for Energy Distributors: Changing 19th 
Century Tariff Structures to Address 21st Century Energy Markets, 29 ENERGY L.J. 157, 
161 (2008) (“In today’s market, with millions of household and small commercial gas and 
electricity customers to serve, the pricing practices of most distributors are still restricted 
to the volumetric pricing of the 19th and early 20th century for the simple reason that household 
and small business meters still only measure the flowing gas and electricity supply”). 
 28.  See Graffy & Kihm, supra note 1, at 11–12 (stating that the “California Legislature 
set the upper bound on residential monthly fixed charges at $10”) (citation omitted). 
 29.  See Thomas Content, Regulators agree to increase fixed charge on We Energy 
electricity bills, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL (Nov. 14, 2014) (http://www.jsonline.com/ 
business/psc-begins-consideration-of-we-energies-rate-hike-plan-b99390765z1-282726581. 
html (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). 
 30.  See, e.g., Sam Robinson, Note, The Carbon Dioxide Debate and Coal Plant 
Permitting in Virginia, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 269, 300 (2010) (Citing 
a study finding that “[e]nergy conservation and efficiency improvements offer Virginia 
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In addition to the two fee-based reform strategies just described, utilities 
have advocated for several other types of policy changes in the past few 
years that adversely impact distributed solar energy.  For example, some 
utilities have sought to reduce amounts credited to net-metered customers 
for the excess power they feed onto the grid.31  An investor-owned utility 
in Colorado sought to more strictly limit the aggregate amount of distributed 
energy generating capacity that it must accept into its net metering program.32  
And Kansas legislators enacted a bill in 2014 that reduced the maximum 
size of distributed energy systems that were eligible for enrollment in net 
metering.33 
Recent efforts to limit rooftop solar energy and weaken net metering 
programs represent a startling shift in the general policy approach toward 
distributed solar energy.  Federal, state, and local governments have been 
actively promoting distributed solar energy through tax credits, subsidies, 
rebates, and other government incentives for years.34  Such policies have 
long served as means of addressing perceived positive externality problems 
that would have otherwise led to sub-optimally low rates of solar 
installations.35  Seemingly overnight, solar-friendly policies are now being 
 
the most cost-effective means of decreasing carbon emissions” associated with electricity 
production and consumption in that state) (citation omitted). 
 31.  For example, the Wisconsin Public Service Commission recently approved 
such changes under a request from We Energies, a large investor-owned utility in that 
state. See Thomas Content, Regulators agree to increase fixed charge on We Energy 
electricity bills, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL (Nov. 14, 2014) http://www.jsonline.com/ 
business/psc-begins-consideration-of-we-energies-rate-hike-plan-b99390765z1-82726581. 
html (last visited Nov. 20, 2014) (stating that, under a newly released Public Service 
Commission decision, We Energies would be authorized to “pay less for the power that 
customers generate with solar panels”). 
 32.  Xcel Energy, an investor-owned utility in Colorado, is an example of a utility 
that has recently advocated for more aggressive caps on net metering.  See ABA Environment, 
Energy and Resources Law Energy and Resource Committee, Year in Review, supra note 
4, at 270. 
 33.  See Karen Uhlenhuth, In defeat for ALEC, Kansas lawmakers pass net metering 
plan, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Apr. 7, 2014) (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) (describing 
newly-enacted legislation in Kansas providing that only residential solar energy installations 
with generating capacities of 15 kilowatts or less may qualify for net metering in that 
state). 
 34.  An exhaustive compilation of links to state incentive programs and policies 
relating to solar energy, U.S. DEP’T  OF ENERGY, http://www.dsireusa.org/solar/. 
 35.  See Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and 
Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL  ECON. 164, 172–73 (2005), available at http://www. 
rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-04-38.pdf (referring to solar energy as providing positive 
externalities). (quoted in Paul Boudreaux, Carrots and Sticks, from President Obama’s 
Solyndra and Beyond, 4 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 1, 41 (2013), available 
at http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Journal%20of%20Energy,%20Climate,%20and%20the%20 
Environment/6-Boudreaux.pdf). 
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replaced with limitations and fees that are likely to slow the pace of 
distributed solar energy growth. 
III.  FAIRNESS AS AN ARGUMENT IN POLICY ANALYSIS 
Notions of fairness are woven throughout utilities’ nationwide movement 
to limit net metering and reform electricity rate designs in response to 
distributed solar energy.  Why has the concept of fairness emerged as a 
driving force in utilities’ recent push for reforms?  And is this emphasis 
on fairness sensible, or should it be cause for concern? 
A.  Utilities’ Focus on Fairness 
Utilities across the country are increasingly appealing to fairness when 
advocating for reforms to net metering programs or rate designs that 
would weaken incentives for rooftop solar energy.  APS made fairness a 
focal point of its successful bid for permission to impose targeted fees on 
solar-using customers.  Throughout its public relations campaign, APS 
emphasized the need for greater fairness as its primary motivation for 
seeking reforms.  The following quote from the APS Manager of Renewable 
Energy typified the utility’s message: 
We love customers to go solar; the energy is a great resource as part of our energy 
portfolio.  But this is about cost shifting and fairness. . .We’re trying to find a 
way to fairly compensate solar users for power they generate but also have them 
fairly pay the price for the grid they are still connected to.36 
Other investor-owned utilities throughout the country have made very 
similar sorts of arguments in connection with their own reform proposals.  
For instance, a spokesperson for Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. discussing 
that utility’s push for net metering reform explained, “We’re not anti-solar 
or anti-wind or trying to slow this down, we’re just trying to keep it fair.”37  
And the Wisconsin utility “We Energies” characterized its recent rate 
reform proposal as “a path to renewable energy fairness.”38 
 
 36.  Kristine Harrington, APS seeks to charge new solar customers more, azfamily. 
com (July 16, 2013) (italics added), available at http://www.azfamily.com/news/APS-seeks-
to-charge-new-solar-customers-more-215759191.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
 37.  Kiley Kroh, Oklahoma Will Charge Customers Who Install Their Own Solar 
Panels, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Apr. 16, 2014, 3:37 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/clim 
ate/2014/04/16/3427392/oklahoma-fee-solar-wind/ (emphasis added). 
 38.  See Path to Renewable Energy Fairness, WE ENERGIES, http://www.we-energies. 
com/renewable_energy_fairness/clarifications_corrections.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). 
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B.  Using Fairness to Defend a Conservative Policy Position? 
Utilities’ heavy reliance on fairness arguments to advocate for policies 
that would slow rooftop energy development is in some sense surprising.  
After all, fairness arguments tend to be most frequently employed by left-
leaning parties to challenge capitalistic policy strategies.  The ideals of 
efficiency and fairness are often characterized as being inherently at odds39:  
conservative policy positions frequently have some grounding in utilitarian 
principles, while progressive positions tend to give greater consideration 
to notions of justice and equity. 
How, then, have advocates of distributed solar energy—a seemingly 
progressive bunch—suddenly found themselves on the opposite side of a 
fairness debate?  And what, if anything, might we learn from this unusual 
dynamic? 
C.  The Potential Disadvantages of Fairness Arguments                                  
in Policy Discussions 
Utilities may rely on fairness arguments to challenge distributed solar 
energy merely because they believe such arguments will resonate well 
among the general public.  However, their emphasis on fairness may be 
hindering policymakers’ efforts to facilitate a smooth national transition 
toward cleaner, distributed energy sources.  As the following discussion 
describes, fairness arguments can often oversimplify complex questions 
and lead to rash or unjustifiable policy decisions. 
Fairness is a concept that pervades human culture and is among the first 
ideals that infants grasp in early stages of child development.40  It is thus 
hardly surprising that idealistic references to fairness appear throughout 
modern law, from fair trade to fair housing to fair labor practices.  As 
evidenced by a recently published book that compiles dozens of top rate 
academic articles on the topic, there is also a vast and rich set of academic 
 
 39.  See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Fairness in Law and Economics: 
An Introduction1 (U. OF CHI. COASE-SANDOR INST. FOR L. & ECON., Working Paper No. 
704, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2504819 
[hereinafter Fennell & McAdams, Fairness in Law & Economics] (noting that “The relationship 
between fairness and the economic concept of efficiency is usually cast as an adversarial 
one”) (citation omitted). 
 40.  See, e.g., Marco F. H. Schmidt & Jessica A. Sommerville, Fairness Expectations 
and Altruistic Sharing in 15-Month-Old Human Infants, 6 PLOS ONE 1 (2011) (describing 
a live human study concluding that infants begin developing a sense fairness as soon as 15 
months after birth). 
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scholarship devoted to notions of fairness and their place in legal 
discourse.41 
Notions of fairness undoubtedly have value in some contexts as a first-
order means of identifying issues relating to justice, equality, or impartiality,42 
and some other policy ideals.43  Claims that a particular proposal or rule 
would be unfair can sometimes help draw attention to certain policy impacts 
that are difficult to articulate and thus might otherwise go unnoticed.44 
However, because such a wide variety of policy impacts can conceivably 
be classified as unfair, appeals to notions of fairness can also breed confusion 
and mislead decision-makers.  The lack of a clear, singular definition of 
fairness can make fairness a difficult standard to pursue since stakeholders 
often have disparate views about what achieving fairness might look like 
in a given context.45 And ambiguities embedded in the word “fair” make 
it particularly prone to manipulation.  Consider, for example, how one scholar 
critiqued the use of the phrase “fair trade” in academic and political circles: 
Fair trade means a moral canonization of pure political arbitrariness . . . Fair trade 
in practice consists of politically anointing certain domestic economic interests, 
and then commandeering the machinery of the state to enforce the political 
dictate. To achieve fair trade requires constant bureaucratic and political 
manipulation and continual revision of the definition of fairness. The definition of 
fair trade has become trade controlled by politicians and bureaucrats.46 
Despite the numerous shortcomings associated with the concept of 
fairness, framing a policy as fair often imbues it with a stamp of correctness 
 
 41.  See generally FAIRNESS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Lee Anne Fennell & Richard 
H. McAdams, eds., Edward Elgar Pub. 2013). 
 42.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 271 (9th ed. 2009) 271 (defining “fair” as 
“[i]mpartial; just; equitable; disinterested” and alternatively defining it to mean “[f]ree 
of bias or prejudice”). 
 43.  See, e.g., Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19, 20–24 (2000) (describing five distinct conceptions 
of “fairness” present in fair labor law). 
 44.  See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 961, 1315 (2001). (“Notions of fairness are like other intuitions and instincts: 
they may suggest a tentative answer to questions, motivate inquiry in useful directions, 
and serve as a check against the tendency to accept too readily new and intriguing yet 
untested ideas”). 
 45.  See, e.g., James R. Kearl, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 607 (1993) (Noting that it 
is “not clear how ‘fairness’ should be defined” and that “whether we judge what we 
observe to be fair or unfair depends on what we believe ‘fairness’ means”). 
 46.  James Bovard, The Morality of Protectionism, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
235, 247–48 (1993).  Fairness has likewise taken on several different definitions in the 
context of fair labor laws.  See generally source cited supra note 43. 
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or “moral superiority.”47  Many people seem to inherently favor what they 
perceive to be the fairest policy or outcome and to give less weight to all 
other considerations. Some scholars have speculated that this inclination 
may be partly due to close ties between humans’ conceptions of fairness 
and their shared system of social norms.48  Regardless, humans’ ingrained 
bias in favor of what they perceive to be fair can make appeals to fairness 
a powerful means of influencing public sentiment on a controversial issue. 
Published research by Professors Steven Shavell and Louis Kaplow has 
brought significant attention to the concept of fairness within legal academic 
circles over the past two decades.49  In essence, these renowned scholars 
argue that policies should be evaluated based “exclusively on their effects 
on individuals’ welfare” with “no independent weight” given to “conceptions 
of fairness.”50  In part because of the potential hazards described above, 
they recommend proceeding cautiously when encountering fairness arguments 
in policy discourse.  To quote Shavell and Kaplow: 
[W]hen a particular result seems fair or unfair to us, we should . . . explore the 
problem, both analytically and empirically, and also reflect on our notion of fairness 
. . . In some instances, we will thereby identify important considerations that we 
might otherwise have omitted from our analysis. At other times, we will find . . . 
our notion of fairness to be misleading . . . [A] common phenomenon is that the 
notion of fairness reflects one important factor in a situation but ignores others.”51 
The pervasive use of fairness arguments in the current debate over net 
metering and solar energy warrants an application of the Shavell and 
Kaplow approach—a closer, more rigorous look at what truly lies behind 
 
 47.  Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
961, 1308 (2001). 
 48.  See id. at 1308–09 (suggesting that humans’ strong tendency to favor policy 
options that they perceive to be fair is at least partly “due to the correspondence between 
notions of fairness and norms of common morality that have been instilled in everyone”). 
 49.  See generally Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between Notions of 
Fairness and the Pareto Principle, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 63 (1999); Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical 
Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus 
Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001). Kaplow’s and Shavell’s thoughtful economic analysis 
of the concept of fairness makes for a fascinating read but unfortunately goes well beyond 
the scope of this short article. 
 50.  Id. at 966.  It should be noted that focusing on individuals’ welfare does not 
equate to ignoring social preferences in favor of such values as non-discrimination or 
equality that that are sometimes framed in terms of fairness.  Theorists have clarified that 
these preferences are to be factored in when formulating the social welfare function.  See 
Anne Fennell McAdams, Fairness in Law and Economics, supra note 39, at 1–2 (observing 
that “fairness is often concerned with distribution, and a social welfare function (SWF) 
can be structured to value certain distributions.  A utilitarian SWF seeks to maximize the 
sum of individual utilities, but welfare theory is also consistent with the selection of a SWF 
that would put some independent weight on achieving equality of welfare across individuals”). 
 51.  Id. at 1315–16. 
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these fairness claims.  What specific impacts are utilities referring to when 
they assert that policies such as net metering and existing rate structures 
are unfair?  And do these impacts create a need for major policy reforms, 
or are they outweighed by other countervailing factors? Closely examining 
these fairness arguments is the only effective mean of evaluating their true 
merits. 
IV.  THE PRIMARY FAIRNESS ARGUMENTS AGAINST POLICIES 
FAVORING DISTRIBUTED SOLAR ENERGY 
Fairness arguments leveled against net metering programs and existing 
rate designs come in various forms and involve several different classes 
of parties.  However, such claims tend to implicate three primary categories 
of victims:  (i) utility customers who have no solar panels, (ii) utility customers 
with low incomes, and (iii) utilities themselves. 
A.  Unfairness Toward Customers Without Rooftop Solar Energy 
Systems:  The “Fair Share” Argument 
The most common fairness-based argument raised against solar net 
metering is that it allows utility customers with rooftop PV systems to 
“free ride” off of other customers who do not have solar panels.52  Numerous 
utilities and their allies have asserted that net metering programs and 
existing rate structures allow customers with solar energy systems to make 
use of the electric grid as a back-up power source without paying their 
“fair share” of the costs of building and maintaining it.53 
 
 52.  Free riding is among the most basic concepts in microeconomic theory.  See 
Kearl, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, supra note 45, at 441 (“Free riding occurs when a person 
benefits from or uses a valuable good or service without having to pay for it”). 
 53.  See, e.g., Kroh, supra note 21 (quoting a Wisconsin utility’s spokesperson as 
saying that “Under the current rates, [solar users] really don’t pay their fair share of grid 
operating costs”); William Pentland, Why the net metering fight is a red herring for 
utilities, UTILITYDIVE.COM (Sept. 22, 2014), available at http://www.utilitydive.com/news/ 
why-the-net-metering-fight-is-a-red-herring-for-utilities/307061/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) 
(quoting the Edison Foundation’s Institute for Electric Innovation as arguing that reforms 
were needed to help ensure that distributed generation customers “pay their fair share of 
the cost of the grid”); Bobby Magill, Okla. Utilities Hit Homes Using Solar with Extra 
Fee, CLIMATECENTRAL.ORG (Apr. 22, 2014), available at http://www.climatecentral.org/ 
news/oklahoma-solar-surcharge-bill-becomes-law-17335 (last visited Nov. 20, 2014) (quoting 
Oklahoma Gas and Electric spokeswoman Kathleen O’Shea as arguing that her company 
merely wants to “make sure everybody who’s using the grid is paying their fair share”). 
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1.  What Does Paying a “Fair Share” of Grid Costs Mean? 
As mentioned above, utility customers in most jurisdictions pay primarily 
volumetric rates for their electricity:  the amount due on their monthly 
electricity bill is based largely upon the number of kilowatt hours (kWh) 
they consume over the billing period.54  Utilities tend to recoup most of 
the variable and fixed costs associated with electricity production and 
distribution by charging customers for their actual consumption of grid-
supplied power.55 
When utility customers install new solar arrays on their rooftops and 
enroll in net metering programs, the quantity of grid-sourced electricity 
they consume each period typically shrinks to a mere fraction of its former 
amount.  Under utilities’ typical volumetric electricity rate structure, this 
decline in the net quantity of delivered power translates into much lower 
power bills for customers with distributed solar energy systems.56  However, 
such customers still rely regularly on the electric grid for backup power 
when the sun is not shining enough to satisfy their energy needs. 
Eventually, utilities must seek increases to their electricity rates to 
enable them to maintain the same basic grid infrastructure while selling 
less power.  The monthly electricity bills paid by non-solar-using customers 
go up as a result of these rate increases, while customers with solar panels 
experience much smaller bill increases.  Because solar users still depend 
on the grid but pay far less than other utility customers pay, some electric 
utilities have claimed that solar energy users do not pay their “fair share” 
of the grid costs.57 
 
 54.  See Mackholm, supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 55.  See Curry, supra note 6 (explaining that the “current regulatory model provides 
recovery of most fixed costs through volumetric (kWh) rates for residential and small 
business  customers. Fixed costs  are  part  of  allowed revenue  requirements,  which are  
spread  over  the  average per-customer kWh sales established  in the test year for mass market 
customers”). 
 56.  Net metering programs greatly amplify  these  savings. See, e.g., Josh Cornfeld, 
How Much Money Will California Customers Save with Net Metering?, GREENTECHMEDIA.COM 
(Aug. 1, 2014), available at http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/how-much- 
money-will-california-solar-customers-save-with-net-metering (last visited Nov. 22, 
2014) (estimating that, “with net energy metering at the retail rate, the solar system 
saves each of the model customers $700 to $1,000 more on their annual electricity bill 
compared to the scenario with no net energy metering at all, equivalent to savings of 
an additional 54 percent to 85 percent”). 
 57.  Numerous utilities and advocates have made this argument.  See, e.g., David Fladeboe, 
Memo: All Should Pay for their Fair Share of the Electric Grid, AMERICANSFORPROSPERITY.ORG 
(Sept. 15, 2014), available at http://americansforprosperity.org/wisconsin/newsroom/memo 
-all-should-pay-for-their-fair-share-of-the-electric-grid/ (“Solar customers . . . should 
have to pay their fair share for the grid that they use as much, if not more, than the rest of 
us”); Melanie Turner, Utilities: solar customers don’t pay fair share, SACRAMENTO BUS. 
J.  (Mar. 16, 2012), available at http://www.bizjournals.com/sacramento/print-
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2.  A More Descriptive Label:  Cross-Subsidization 
Utilities’ “fair share” arguments against solar users can be alternatively 
described as arguments against cross-subsidization.  To the extent that they 
compel utilities to raise electricity rates, net metering and existing rate 
designs can potentially create cross-subsidies in favor of solar energy users. 
One stakeholder has compared such purported subsidies to subsidies 
enjoyed by owners of electric cars who regularly use public roads but do 
not buy gasoline and thus avoid paying the gasoline taxes that fund much 
of a jurisdiction’s road construction and maintenance.58  Drivers of electric 
cars are arguably able to use public roads without paying their fair share 
of the costs associated with road construction and maintenance, forcing 
drivers of gasoline-powered vehicles pick up the tab.59 
3.  Cross-Subsidies Are Not Necessarily Bad Policy 
However, evidence that net metering programs and existing electricity 
rate designs are creating cross-subsidies among utility customers would 
not necessarily mean that such policies are undesirable.  Indeed, basic 
microeconomic theory teaches that subsidies can be a valuable tool for 
promoting economic efficiency when tailored to address positive externality 
problems that might otherwise lead to a sub-optimally low quantity of 
some socially valuable activity.60 
 
edition/2012/03/16/ utilities-solar-users-dont-pay-enough.html?page=all (quoting a 
spokesperson for Pacific Gas & Electric Co. as being “concerned that there is a cost shift 
and those customers are not paying their fair share” of transmission and distribution costs); 
Ian Clover, Utilities in several US states plan ways to make solar customers pay more, PV 
MAG. (Sept. 24, 2013), available at http://www.pv-
magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/utilities-in-several-us-states-plan-ways-to-make-solar-
customers-pay-more_100012824/#axzz3JonYME3V (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (quoting 
Arizona Public Service Co. spokesman as justifying proposed rate reforms on the ground 
that “[e]veryone who’s using the grid ought to pay their fair share”). 
 58.  See Amy Joi O’Donoghue, Critics wants lights out on net-metering bill, 
DESERET NEWS (Feb. 24, 2014, 5:15 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865597293/ 
Critics-wants-lights-out-on-net-metering-bill.html?pg=all (describing Utah State Senator 
Curt Bramble’s comparison between solar energy users and electric car drivers). 
 59.  See id. 
 60.  See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 86 (10th ed. 2014) (explaining positive 
externality problems and how such problems may be addressed through Pigouvian subsidies). 
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Laws intentionally creating direct and indirect subsidies have existed 
for decades, promoting everything from basic research61 to home ownership62 
to charitable donations.63  Governments use tax revenues to support a wide 
range of subsidies.64  Tax-funded subsidy programs result in cross-subsidies 
from the broad base of all taxpaying citizens to those citizens engaged in 
certain, subsidized activities such as homeownership or charitable giving.  
Sometimes, subsidy programs facilitate rent seeking behavior and unwarranted 
wealth transfers to undeserving special interest groups.65  However, many 
subsidies are not the product of rent seeking and appear to do much to 
correct market failures and promote the social welfare. 
In fact, cross-subsidies have long existed within electric utility rates and 
many electric utilities have deliberately embedded cross-subsidies into 
their pricing for decades.  For example, some utilities offer special discounted 
rates to certain commercial or industrial electricity users as a means of 
enticing them to relocate into their territories.66  Numerous utilities also 
facilitate cross-subsidies to low-income customers through various income-
based rate discount programs.67  So long as such differential pricing is not 
 
 61.  See Michael Livingston, Risky Business: Economics, Culture, and the Taxation 
of High-Risk Activities, 48 TAX L. REV. 163, 218–19 (1993) (describing externalities as a 
common justification for basic research and development). 
 62.  See Gregg D. Polsky, Rationally Cutting Tax Expenditures, 50 U. LOUISVILLE 
L. REV. 643, 655 (2012) (explaining that “proponents of the mortgage deduction argue that 
home ownership creates positive externalities” and that “[t]his is the most common justification 
for continuing the mortgage interest deduction” under federal income tax law). 
 63.  See David A. Weisbach, What Does Happiness Research Tell Us About 
Taxation?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 293S, S320 (2008) (stating that “charitable donations have 
a positive externality (they help the recipient as well as provide utility to the donor) and, 
therefore, might be subsidized” on that ground). 
 64.  See Walter F. Dodd, The Growth of National Power, 32 YALE L.J. 452, 454 
(1923) (“The income tax amendment, by giving to the national government a large 
additional source of revenue, has made it possible for the nation to embark upon a system 
of subsidies to the states, through which the nation has come to a large extent to determine 
state policies as to education, highway construction, and other matters”). 
 65.  See Jason Brennan, The Right to Good Faith: How Crony Capitalism 
Delegitimizes the Administrative State, 11 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 317, 328 (2013) (explaining 
that a “firm engages in rent seeking when it tries to manipulate the political environment 
for its own benefit” and adding that rent seeking is a “socially destructive” practice). 
 66.  See Charles F. Phillips, Jr., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, REGPU CH 
10, 2005 WL 998372, 97 (1988) “[T]here are special discount rates; rates that have been 
proposed and adopted (often on an experimental basis) that are commonly known as ‘incentive’ 
or ‘economic development’ rates.  Such rates ‘are designed both to promote increased 
sales to existing industrial customers and to attract new firms to a utility’s service 
territory’” but “raise issues of undue discrimination”). 
 67.  See STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 10:17 (34th ed. 2014) 
(providing a comprehensive review of low-income electric rate discount programs in the 
United States). 
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“unreasonably discriminatory”, it is generally permissible in most 
jurisdictions.68 
In addition to the intentional cross-subsidies just described, incidental 
cross-subsidies have likewise existed within utilities’ electricity pricing 
since the earliest years of the regulated utility model.  To illustrate this 
idea, consider Ann and Beth—two hypothetical residential utility customers 
receiving electricity service from a common utility company.  Suppose 
that Ann lives about one mile from a large natural gas-fired power plant 
that generates most of her utility’s supply of electricity.  A single distribution 
line carries that power directly from the power plant to Ann’s home.  In 
contrast, Beth lives more than 100 miles away from the power plant, so 
the electricity she uses must traverse tens of millions of dollars’ worth of 
grid infrastructure before reaching her residence.  Assuming that Ann and 
Beth pay identical retail rates and fees for their electric power, Ann subsidizes 
Beth’s use of the electric grid—Beth arguably doesn’t pay her “fair share” 
of the costs of maintaining it.  And yet, such cross-subsidies have been an 
accepted reality for regulated electricity pricing for generations.  It would 
be nearly impossible to price electricity so as to perfectly avoid such 
cross-subsidization,69 so utilities seldom characterize these sorts of cross-
subsidies as unfair. 
Given that subsidies can sometimes be valuable policy tools and that at 
other times they are very costly to avoid, case-by-case analysis is required 
to determine whether any particular policy creating a subsidy is justifiable.  
In the case of distributed solar energy, the proper question is not an ambiguous 
one about whether the alleged cross-subsidies associated with policies 
supporting distributed solar energy are “fair.”  Instead, decision-makers 
should be asking whether these policies are a justified means of furthering 
important social goals. 
Policies benefiting distributed solar energy arguably do advance a 
legitimate policy goal:  they address a positive externality problem and 
 
 68.  See Steven Ferrey, Solving the Multimillion Dollar Constitutional Puzzle 
Surrounding State “Sustainable” Energy Policy, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 121, 164 
(2014) (“If classifications are reasonable, disparity in rates may exist between different 
classes of customers and, typically, industrial, residential, commercial and municipal 
customers pay different rates for their services”) (citations omitted). 
 69.  U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer has emphasized the inherent 
imprecision associated with utility rate setting.  See STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS 
REFORM 47 (“It is clear that setting a rate of return cannot, even in principle, be reduced 
to an exact science . . . and suggestions of a proper rate—carried out to several decimal 
places—give an air of precision that must be false”). 
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thereby promote more optimal levels of investment in rooftop solar 
energy. Solar energy generation is widely recognized as creating benefits 
that are not easily captured by producers of that energy.  For example, a 
recent study focused on APS territory concluded that the benefits of 
distributed solar generation in that region actually exceeded its costs by 
more than 50% because it reduced peak demands while helping the utility 
to comply with state renewable portfolio standard requirements.70  Solar 
energy generation also displaces demand for fossil fuel-generated power 
and the adverse environmental impacts associated with it—additional 
benefits that ordinarily cannot be fully captured by generators of solar 
power.71  In the absence of any government intervention, this positive 
externality problem is likely to result in a sub-optimally low quantity of 
solar energy production.72  Policies that directly or indirectly subsidize 
solar energy generation to encourage more of it can be a useful means of 
helping to correct that market failure.73  Accordingly, policymakers have 
used federal investment tax credits and other programs to aggressively 
subsidize renewable energy development for nearly a decade.74  There is 
no obvious reason why a subsidy to solar energy users is any less fair when 
it results from net metering programs and volumetric electricity rates than 
when it is administered more directly through tax credits or similar means. 
A more legitimate policy concern associated increasing rooftop PV 
installations and existing policies is the risk that this combination could 
ultimately drive utilities into insolvency—the death spiral scenario 
highlighted above.75  Reductions in the reliability or quality of electricity 
service under such a scenario could impose widespread economic losses 
 
 70.  See R. Thomas Beach & Patrick G. McGuire, SEIA/Crossborder Energy: The 
Benefits And Costs Of Solar Distributed Generation  For Arizona Public Service at 2, available 
at http://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/resources/AZ-Distributed-Generation.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2014) (concluding that “the benefits of [distributed generation] on the APS 
system exceed the cost, such that new [distributed generation] resources will not impose 
a burden on APS’s ratepayers . . . The benefits exceed the costs by more than 50%, with 
a benefit/cost ratio of 1.54”). 
 71.  See Diana S. Power, Solar Power Begins to Shine as Environmental Benefits 
Pay Off, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2013 (describing numerous environmental benefits of 
PV-generated power as an alternative to coal-generated electricity). 
 72.  See Rosen, supra note 60, at 106 (explaining that, “[w]hen an individual or firm 
produces positive externalities, the market underprovides the activity or good, but an 
appropriate subsidy can remedy the situation”). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See Zachary Scott Simmons, Subsidizing Solar: The Case for an Environmental 
Goods and Services Carve-out from the Global Subsidies Regime, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 422, 432–38 (2014) (Providing a detailed summary of the recent cadre of 
aggressive subsidy programs directed at promoting solar energy, beginning with the 30 
percent federal Investment Tax Credit instituted under the Energy Policy Act of 2005). 
 75.  Supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
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and may thus be worthy of policymakers’ attention.  Inventive policies are 
needed to facilitate the growth of distributed generation technologies 
while promoting a smooth and non-disruptive transition away from 
centralized power.  Unfortunately, rhetoric fixation on fairness among 
customers can make it difficult to focus on these more genuine policy 
challenges. 
B.  Unfairness Toward Low-Income Utility Customers:                               
The Regressivity Argument 
Another common fairness-based argument against net metering and 
existing rate design is that such policies are income-regressive, creating 
wealth transfers from low-income customers to high-income ones.  Such 
regressivity-based unfairness claims have surfaced in multiple states in 
recent years in debates over solar-related utility policy reforms.76  These 
claims combine the cross-subsidy concept described above with assumptions 
about the socioeconomic status of solar-using utility customers.  In essence, 
the argument is that cost barriers prevent lower-income customers getting 
rooftop solar panels, leaving them no option but to pay ever higher utility 
rates for conventional power as wealthier customers go solar.77  As one 
utility representative summarized it: 
Low-income customers can’t put on solar panels—let’s be blunt. . .So why 
should a low-income customer have their rates go up for the benefit of someone 
who puts on a solar panel. . .?78 
Do potential wealth distribution impacts create a compelling reason to 
reform net metering programs and rate designs in response to the growth 
of distributed solar energy?  On the one hand, although market prices of 
 
 76.  See, e.g., Melissa Powers, Small is (Still) Beautiful: Designing U.S. Energy 
Policies to Increase Localized Renewable Energy Generation, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 595, 
647 (2012) (“[U]tilities have raised populist arguments in which they characterize net 
metering policies as wealth transfer mechanisms that force poorer ratepayers to 
subsidize the renewable energy proclivities of wealthier ratepayers”); Monica Martinez, 
The Poor Shouldn’t Have to Bear the Cost of Solar Power, FORBES, June 13, 2014 
(opinion) (arguing that solar net metering results in an “unfair cost shift” from low-income 
families to high-income families). 
 77.  See Powers, supra note 76, at 655 (“Since wealthier customers will typically 
install distributed generation systems, but the costs of supporting distributed generation 
are shared among ratepayers, this may appear to be an unfair wealth transfer”). 
 78.  Diane Cardwell, Solar Panel Payments Set off a Fairness Debate, N.Y. TIMES,  
June 5, 2012, at B1. 
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rooftop PV and other distributed energy systems have declined precipitously 
over the past decade, such systems still remain out of reach for many 
residential consumers.79  Solar leasing companies such as SolarCity and 
SunRun have helped to expand the accessibility of distributed solar energy 
to some customers with lesser means.80  Still, even these companies generally 
require that customers have solid credit histories and stable incomes to 
qualify for their products.81  Since lower-income customers are less likely 
to go solar and be beneficiaries of any purported cross-subsidies associated 
with it, net metering and some other pro-solar utility policies arguably 
could be characterized as income-regressive. 
On the other hand, investing in solar PV systems is less financially 
appealing to low-income customers in much of the country because of the 
significant rate discounts that are available to these customers based on 
their income levels.82  For example, in APS territory in Arizona, a family 
of five with an annual household income of nearly $42,000 can qualify 
for rate discounts between 26 percent and 65 percent.83  In contrast, a 
recent study by Berkeley Labs determined that even if a hypothetical 
utility in the Southwestern United States was to fill 10 percent of its 
electricity demand via solar energy, utility rates in that jurisdiction would 
likely increase by only 2.5 percent.84  Such a modest rate increase would 
 
 79.  See Christine Tusher, Everything You Need to Know About Adding Solar Panels 
At Home, FORBES, May 17, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/houzz/2014/05/17/everything-
you-need-to-know-about-adding-solar-panels-at-home/ (noting that, nationwide, the average 
up-front cost (after tax credits and other subsidies) for a residential solar energy system 
was about $17,000). 
 80.  See Gabriel Schnlitzler, Clean Tech Opportunities in Green Building Legislation, 5 
AM. U. BUS. L. BRIEF 42, 49 (2008) (describing how “financing innovations from companies 
such as SunRun and Solar City. . .try to reduce up front solar installation costs by making 
sales to consumers via power purchase agreements and equipment leases”). 
 81.  See Jonathan Fahey, Can you go solar?  Leases and loans make it possible, USA 
TODAY, Oct. 12, 2014 (noting that SolarCity’s solar lease and loan plans “generally 
require[] a high credit score” and that “SolarCity will only lend to those with a credit score 
of at least 680”). 
 82.  See FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 67, § 10:17 (providing 
a comprehensive review of low-income electric rate discount programs in the United States). 
 83.  To review the discounts available to lower-income residential customers in APS 
territory, visit the APS limited income home web page at  http://www.aps.com/en/ residential/ 
accountservices/assistanceprograms/pages/limited-income-home.aspx (last visited Nov. 24, 
2014) (providing that a household of five individuals with a total household income of no 
more than $3,489 per month (or $41,858 per year) could qualify for discounts on electricity 
of between 26% and 65 percent under the APS Energy Support Program). 
 84.  See Andrew Satchwell, et al., Financial Impacts of Net-Metered PV on 
Utilities and Ratepayers: A Scoping Study of Two Prototypical  U.S. Utilities, BERKLEY 
LAB: ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND POLICY GROUP at 29 (Sept. 2014), available at http:// 
emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/LBNL%20PV%20Business%20Models%20Report_no%20rep
ort%20number%20(Sept%2025%20revision).pdf (At 10% PV penetration . . . average retail 
rates for the SW utility are 0.35 cents/kWh (2.5%) higher than without PV”). 
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barely begin to offset the massive cross-subsidies for which low-income 
customers already qualify. 
Moreover, utilities can often mitigate the potential income distribution 
effects of net metering and volumetric rate structures without sacrificing 
solar-friendly utility policies.  For instance, utilities with such concerns 
can simply increase the magnitude of their rate discounts to lower-income 
customers.85  Utilities can even help to fund such additional discounts by 
adopting Oregon’s policy of contributing unused net metering credits to 
low-income assistance programs.86 
Ironically, some utilities’ proposals to reform net metering policies or 
rate designs affecting distributed solar energy could ultimately harm low-
income customers.  As some advocacy groups have recently pointed out, 
these sorts of reforms could ultimately drive greater numbers of solar-
using customers to leave the electric grid entirely and use distributed 
energy storage systems for backup power.87  Such an exodus would only 
increase the long-term cost burden on lower-income customers who 
remained connected to the grid. 
Reforms that weakened the policy incentives for distributed solar 
energy could also help to perpetuate energy-related environmental 
injustices that often disproportionately victimize low-income populations.  
For example, low-income citizens are more likely to live near coal-fired 
power plants, nuclear power facilities, oil refineries, and other locales 
made less desirable because of adverse impacts of conventional energy 
production.88  Net metering, volumetric electricity rates, and other utility-
 
 85.  At least one scholar has noted this possibility.  See Power, supra note 76, at 655 
(“Even among residential customers, several states offer low-income payment assistance 
and lifeline rates designed to provide affordable electricity services for poor customers.  Thus, 
maintenance of these rate design strategies should mitigate the possibility of wealth 
transfer”). 
 86.  See OR. REV. STAT. § 757.300(3)(d) (2013) (providing that “any remaining 
unused kilowatt-hour credit accumulated during the previous year shall be granted to the 
electric utility for distribution to customers enrolled in the electric utility’s low-income 
assistance programs” or used in certain other limited ways set forth in the provision). 
 87.  See Herman K. Trabish, The fight over solar moves from net metering to rate 
design, UTILITY DIVE (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-fight-over- 
solar-moves-from-net-metering-to-rate-design/327742/ (describing how groups such as 
AARP and the NAACP opposed Madison Gas & Electric’s proposed increase in fixed 
customer fees because of feared impacts on lower-income customers). 
 88.  A 2012 NAACP report highlights this problem.  See Adrian Wilson, et al., Coal 
Blooded, NAACP 15 (2012), http://www.naacp.org/page/-/Climate/CoalBlooded.pdf (last 
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related policies that promote renewable energy arguably help to limit these 
injustices as well.89 
Finally, some economists would argue that policymakers should not 
even consider income distribution effects when structuring net metering 
and electricity rates.  As Professors Shavell and Kaplow have observed, 
weighing wealth distribution impacts in these contexts tends to result in 
unnecessary economic distortions.  In their words: 
[W]hen legal rules do have distributive effects, the effects usually should not be 
counted as favoring or disfavoring the rules because distributional objectives can 
often be best accomplished directly, using the income tax and transfer (welfare) 
programs.  One reason economists have tended to favor these direct means of 
redistribution is that they reach all individuals and are based explicitly on income.90 
Put differently, reforming net metering policies or redesigning electricity 
rates on account of wealth distribution impacts is generally inefficient and 
undesirable from the perspective of all socioeconomic classes.  For all of 
the aforementioned reasons, such impacts are not viable grounds for reforming 
existing utility policies in response to the growth of rooftop solar power. 
C.  Unfairness Toward Utilities and Their Investors:  The                           
“Breach of Regulatory Contract” Argument 
One other type of fairness argument that might be leveled against solar-
friendly utility policies is that such policies are unfair to investor-owned 
utilities and their shareholders.  Unsurprisingly, utilities tend to make this 
argument more sparingly.  Citizens tend to be less inclined to sympathize 
with corporations and investors than with ordinary utility customers.  In 
truth, policies that promote the growth of distributed renewable energy 
probably create greater financial risks for utilities than for their customers 
or anyone else.91 
Regulated electric utilities have long been viewed as having an implicit 
contract with state regulators.  Under this contract—which is commonly 
 
visited Feb. 3, 2015) (finding that “coal power plants tend to be disproportionately located 
in low-income communities”). 
 89.  See Jeanetta Williams, Net metering is fair, benefits all communities, LAS VEGAS 
SUN, Oct. 12, 2014, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2014/oct/12/net-metering-fair-benefits- 
all-communities/ (Local NAACP leader arguing in favor of solar-friendly utility policies 
on the ground that the “costs of continuing on the fossil fuel-dependent paths are 
disproportionately borne by low-income communities and communities of color” but that 
“the development of clean energy sources, such as solar, provides an opportunity to improve 
the health and well-being of everyone”). 
 90.  Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, supra note 49, at 993–94. 
 91.  See Satchwell, et al., supra note 84, at 60 (“Compared to the impacts on 
ratepayers, the impacts of customer-sited PV on utility shareholders are potentially much 
more pronounced”). 
RULE(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/2016  9:18 AM 
[VOL. 6:  115, 2014–15]  Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness 
 SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 139 
referred to as a “regulatory contract”92—utilities generally must provide 
power to all parties within their designated geographic territory and must 
only charge rates approved by their state’s regulating entity.93  In return, 
utilities have historically enjoyed legally protected monopoly status within 
their assigned territories94 and rights to charge electricity rates sufficiently 
high to generate reasonable financial returns.95 
Utility policies that support the growth of distributed solar energy 
arguably threaten both of the promised benefits that utilities have historically 
enjoyed under their implicit contract with state regulators.  First, such 
policies help a powerful disruptive technology to erode away at utilities’ 
monopoly power within their designated territories.  Net-metered solar energy 
users compete directly with conventional utilities, displacing customer demand 
in an already-tepid electricity market that utilities have long occupied 
almost entirely on their own.96  From the perspective of some utilities, 
policies supporting a new market entrant—distributed solar energy—
might seem to contravene regulators’ implicit promise of  monopoly 
franchise protection. 
 
 92.  Professors Gregory Sidak and Daniel Spurber helped to popularize the regulatory 
contract concept by publishing a book that employs the phrase in its title.  See generally J. 
GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY 
CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997). 
 93.  This “duty to serve” is a common thread in utility regulation generally and 
frequently extends to water utilities and other utility entities.  For a more detailed discussion of 
the concept of a duty to serve, see generally Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” 
and Protection of Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 
51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1248–50 (1998) (summarizing the history of the “duty to serve” 
in utilities law). 
 94.  Electric utilities have enjoyed such exclusive franchise rights since the earliest 
days of the electricity grid.  See id. at 1265 (describing  Samuel Insull’s historic formation 
of the Chicago Edison utility and attainment of an exclusive franchise for a designated 
geographic territory in connection with that enterprise). 
 95.  To review the basic principles and theories of cost-based utility rate regulation, 
see generally FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT  
60–65 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 2006) (describing utilities’ typical rights to charge “just 
and reasonable” rates, which seek to allow a utility to cover its costs and earn a reasonable 
rate of return). 
 96.  See John Kemp, Integrated approach needed to U.S. electricity policy, REUTERS 
(Nov. 24, 2014, 5:38 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/24/us-usa-electricity-
carbon-kemp-idUSKCN0J522Z20141124 (reporting that “North America’s peak electricity 
demand is forecast to increase by just 1 percent a year for the next decade, the slowest rate 
of growth on record”). 
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Distributed solar-friendly utility policies can also cut indirectly into 
utilities’ earnings and jeopardize utilities’ ability to generate reasonable 
and predictable returns on their investments.  As net-metered PV systems 
become more prevalent and more cost-competitive with conventional 
electricity, utilities’ historically stable earnings are likely to decline.97  
Most net metering programs require utilities to effectively purchase any 
excess electricity generated by their customers’ energy systems, often at 
retail rates that are significantly higher than the rates that utilities generally 
pay for wholesale power.98  For obvious reasons, these mandated purchases 
can significantly soften utilities’ earnings outlooks and increase the risk of 
substantial stranded costs—investments in infrastructure that utilities are 
ultimately unable to fully recover from customers.99 
In the eyes of utilities, state regulators’ policy support of a distributed 
solar energy industry that is bringing unwelcome changes to conventional 
utility markets may feel like an “unfair” breach of their regulatory contract.  
Language released by FERC in the context of wholesale electricity 
deregulation nearly 20 years ago encapsulates this type of appeal to fairness: 
Utilities have invested billions of dollars in order to meet their obligations. Those 
investments have been made under a “regulatory compact” whereby utilities—
and their shareholders—expect to recover prudently incurred costs. With the 
advent of competition, even prudent investments may become stranded. Reliance 
on past contractual and regulatory practices must be recognized and past investments 
must be protected to assure an orderly, fair transition to competition.100 
Unfortunately, utilities tend to overlook one important fact when making 
this sort of unfairness claim:  their regulatory contract was never intended 
 
 97.  See Satchwell, et al., supra note 84, at 26–27 (describing two separate mechanisms 
for how the growth of distributed PV can reduce utility shareholder earnings and 
estimating that a 10% market penetration of customer-cited PV would cause a hypothetical 
southwestern United States utility company to suffer earnings decreases of approximately 
5.7%). 
 98.  See Steven Ferrey, et al., Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon 
Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
125, 186–87 (2010) (“Net metering can pay the eligible renewable energy source 
approximately four times more for this power when it rolls backwards at the retail rate than 
paid to any other independent power generators for wholesale power, and much more than 
the time-dependent value of this power to the purchasing utility”). 
 99.  See Herbert Hovencamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory 
Bargains, 108 YALE L.J. 801, 802–03 (1999) (defining stranded costs as “investments in 
specialized, durable assets that may have seemed necessary, or at least justifiable, 
when constructed and placed into service under a regime of price and entry controls but 
that have become underutilized or even useless under deregulation”). 
 100.  FERC PROPOSED REGULATIONS, 32,514, Promoting Wholesale Competition 
Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery 
of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities (proposed Mar. 29, 1995), 
18 C.F.R. Part 385, 60 F.R. 17662, 2013 WL 4290204 (C.C.H.) (2013) (italics added). 
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to include a perpetual guarantee of protection against disruptive innovation.101  
Facilitating the growth of rooftop solar energy is fundamentally different 
from allowing a new utility company to construct a utility-scale power 
plant and distribution infrastructure within an incumbent utility’s territory 
and begin selling grid-supplied power there.  The rooftop solar energy 
industry is a competitive threat borne of valuable and rapidly advancing 
technologies that have the potential to transform how the world produces 
and distributes electricity.  A duty to shield utilities from this sort of 
innovation was never contemplated as falling within the regulatory contract.  
To quote one pair of scholars: 
Historical precedent clearly shows that when emerging conditions create a critical 
tension between upholding social welfare objectives and upholding continuity of 
a utility for its own sake, courts will decisively favor social welfare objectives 
and markets play no favorites.  Indeed, neither regulators nor courts can ultimately 
protect regulated utilities from all competition, even when—perhaps especially 
when—the character of that competition challenges the viability of their fundamental 
business model.102 
For similar reasons, utility shareholders have also assumed risks associated 
with disruptive innovation.  The average return on investment for equity 
shares in utility companies is a bit lower than that of the stock market 
generally,103 but it is significantly higher than that available from investments 
in treasury bills or other very-low-risk assets.104  Part of the reason that 
utility stocks have historically generated comparatively higher returns is 
that there are additional risks associated with these investments, including 
the risk that disruptive innovation could render utilities obsolete.  In short, 
as threatening and frustrating as the growth of the distributed solar energy 
 
 101.  Other scholars have emphasized this idea. See, e.g., Graffy & Kihm, supra note 
1, at 27–28 (asserting that “utilities have no constitutional protection against competitive 
impacts” and that “even low-risk companies cannot expect to remain low-risk indefinitely 
and may shift into higher risk status in surprisingly short periods of time given sufficiently 
disruptive conditions”). 
 102.  Graffy & Kihm, supra note 1, at 16. 
 103.  See Larry Swedroe, Should You Invest in Utility Stocks?, CBS NEWS (Oct. 3, 
2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/should-you-invest-in-utility-stocks/ (last visited Nov. 
25, 2013) (reporting that, “[f]or the 85-year period 1927–2011, the total stock market provided 
an annual average return of 11.6 percent, with an annual standard deviation of 20.5 percent. 
Utilities produced a slightly lower annual average return of 11.3 percent”). 
 104.  See id. (explaining that, “[f]or many, safe bond investments no longer generate 
the interest income they need to meet expenses” and that “[t]his is causing them to take on 
incremental risk in their search for greater yields” such as through “investing in utility 
stocks”). 
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industry may seem in the eyes of utility executives, state policies tailored 
to facilitate such growth neither constitute an unfair breach of the regulatory 
contract nor necessitate reforms to existing net metering programs or rate 
designs. 
V.  FAIRNESS ARGUMENTS CAN CUT BOTH WAYS 
All of this discussion of fairness begs one additional question that 
should not go unmentioned:  what if the actions of utilities were subjected 
to the same fairness lens they have used to critique distributed solar energy 
policies in recent years?  Appeals to fairness are often characterized as a 
double-edge sword.105  To the extent that investor-owned utilities insist on 
talking about solar energy-related policy issues in terms of fairness, they 
might reasonably anticipate having fairness arguments directed back at 
them.  The strategies that some investor-owned utilities have employed in 
responding to distributed solar energy technologies arguably offend notions 
of fairness more than any of the purportedly unfair aspects of net metering 
or existing rate designs. 
A.  Should Regulated Utilities Be Permitted to Compete in the                  
Private Rooftop Solar Energy Market? 
Consider, for example, a few regulated utilities’ recent proposals to directly 
compete within the private rooftop solar energy industry.  Arizona’s APS 
utility has proposed such a plan, seeking state regulators’ permission to 
install solar PV arrays on 3,000 homes within its territory pursuant to a 
new rooftop leasing program.106  Under the APS proposal, residential 
customers who participated in the program would receive a $30 monthly 
credit on their electricity bills—an amount greater than the monthly $5 to 
$10 savings that a typical APS customer can earn through arrangements 
 
 105.  See, e.g., Mark Klock, Is it the Will of the People or a Broken Arrow?  Collective 
Preferences, Out-of-the-Money Options, Bush v. Gore, and Arguments for Quashing Post-
Balloting Litigation Absent Specific Allegations of Fraud, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 27 
(2002) (“[F]airness is a double-edged sword”); MARVIN KOHL, THE MORALITY OF KILLING 
17 (1974) (“[F]airness is a double-edged sword”) (cited in Mark Strasser, Assisted Suicide 
and the Competent Terminally Ill: On Ordinary Treatments and Extraordinary Policies, 
74 OR. L. REV. 539, 559 n.105 (2005)); James B. Zagel, Drug Rhetoric, Courts, and the 
Law: A Response to Professor Rudovsky, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 275, 277 (1994) (“. . . 
fairness cuts both ways. . .”); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign 
Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1190 n.52 (2007) (“. . . fairness cuts both ways . . .”). 
 106.  To learn more about the APS rooftop solar proposal, see http://www.aps.com/ 
en/ourcompany/aboutus/investmentinrenewableenergy/Pages/azsun.aspx?src=azsun (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2014). 
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with private solar leasing companies in that state.107  Tucson Electric 
Power, another Arizona utility, has proposed a similar sort of plan.108 
Some solar energy industry advocates have contended that it would be 
unfair to allow regulated utilities to compete in private rooftop solar 
markets.  Regulated utilities enjoy the unique benefits of state-protected 
returns on investment and consequent access to comparatively low-cost 
capital—special government-provided benefits that are simply unavailable to 
private solar energy companies.109  Any proposal permitting regulated utilities, 
armed with these advantages, to enter into private rooftop solar markets, 
would instantly create an uneven playing field tilted in utilities’ favor.  In 
the words of one solar energy industry spokesperson: 
This latest tactic by APS has a ‘Trojan horse’ smell to it. Our member companies 
welcome fair and equal competition, but this move would stack the deck in favor 
of a company which can rate-base solar with a guaranteed rate of return. How is 
that fair?110 
As with the other fairness-based arguments examined in Section IV  
above, accurately assessing the merits of this unfairness claim requires 
identifying and more carefully analyzing the argument at issue.  In this 
instance, the purportedly unfair policy is to permit an entity enjoying 
special government benefits as a regulated utility to operate in a competitive 
market—one that is not prone to the sort of market failures that ordinarily 
justify such regulatory protections. 
Natural monopoly problems tend to arise in markets in which 
producers’ cost structures are such that a “single firm can take advantage 
 
 107.  See Ryan Randazzo, APS wants to put free solar panels on 3,000 homes, 
AZCENTRAL.COM (JUL. 28, 2014), http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/2014/ 
07/28/aps-wants-put-free-solar-panels-homes/13299121/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (reporting 
that, when customers lease panels from SolarCity, “their new, lower power bills combined 
with the lease payments bring about $5 to $10 a month in savings for customers”). 
 108.  See Robert Walton, Tucson Electric Power proposes new utility-owned rooftop 
solar program, UTILITYDIVE.COM (Aug. 20, 2014), available at http://www.utilitydive.com/ 
news/tucson-electric-power-proposes-new-utility-ownedrooftop-solar-program/299840/ (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2014) (describing Tucson Electric Power’s proposal and quoting a solar 
energy industry advocate contending that the utility was “trying to go into a completely 
new market and compete on an unlevel playing field in a market that’s already served by 
competitive forces”). 
 109.  See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text. 
  110.  Stephen Lacey, Arizona Public Service Enters the Rooftop Solar Business: 
Good for Installers or a Trojan Horse?, GREENTECHMEDIA.COM (July 30, 2014), available 
at http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/arizona-public-service-enters-the-rooftop-solar- 
biz (last visited Nov. 25, 2014). 
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of economies of scale and supply the entire industry output, at least for a 
sizable region.”111  Conventional power distribution is highly vulnerable 
to natural monopoly problems because of the very high up-front costs 
associated with it.  Regulators have long addressed this vulnerability 
through the familiar regulated monopoly model described above.112 
Producers in the market for residential rooftop solar products do not 
face the exceptionally high up-front capital costs and steeply declining 
average cost functions faced by regulated utilities.  The barriers to entry 
into the rooftop solar market are far lower than for centralized utility-scale 
electricity generation and distribution. These lower barriers to entry have 
allowed a competitive and well-functioning market for rooftop solar 
leases and installations to emerge in recent years.113 
Given the absence of a natural monopoly problem in the rooftop solar 
energy market, there is no legitimate policy justification for allowing 
regulated utilities to compete in it.  For the same reasons that regulated 
utilities are not permitted to open retail stores and sell table lamps or ceiling 
fans, utilities should not be permitted to directly compete against private 
companies that sell or lease rooftop solar products.  Regardless of whether 
policies allowing utilities to enter the rooftop solar market would be 
unfair, they would be bad policy. 
B.  Should Regulated Utilities Be Permitted to Fund Campaigns               
Aimed at Protecting Their Monopolies Against                                     
Disruptive Innovation? 
Some within the solar industry have also criticized investor-owned 
utilities in recent years for leveraging their financial and political prowess 
to protect their own interests at the expense of their customers.  As mentioned 
above, electric utilities typically enjoy exclusive franchise rights and 
regulated pricing designed to ensure reasonable investment returns.114  
However, they also generate profits for private shareholders and can thus 
have company-specific interests that are markedly different from the 
prevailing interests of their customers.  Should regulated utilities be permitted 
to spend millions of dollars on political activities aimed at protecting their 
own interests and delaying the impacts of disruptive innovation? 
 
 111.  Rosen, PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 60, at 315. 
 112.  See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text. 
 113.  See Robert McIntosh & James Mandel, Why Solar Installers are Becoming 
Vertically Integrated, CLEANTECHNICA.COM (July 19, 2014), http://cleantechnica.com/2014/07/ 
19/5-reasons-solar-installers-integrating-vertically/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (“The solar 
installation market is still very large with a lot of small players. The barriers to entry are 
low; any electrical contractor can get the parts and equipment to make installations”).  
 114.  See generally supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
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As distributed solar energy becomes more prevalent and utilities seek 
regulatory approvals or reforms aimed at responding to these new 
technologies, utilities can be tempted to contribute to campaigns aimed at 
swaying political forces in their favor.  For example, in 2013, the parent 
company of the Arizona utility APS spent roughly $3.7 million on 
advertising and lobbying associated with its proposal to impose monthly 
fees on users of solar power.115  Ultimately, APS won approval to impose 
the nation’s first-ever fees on solar users.  These fees make the purchase 
or lease of rooftop solar panels less financially rewarding for customers 
in APS territory, thereby helping to shield APS from this increasingly 
threatening form of market competition. 
The fact that APS won approval to impose special fees on solar energy 
users may be startling to some, given the long history of subsidies aimed 
at promoting solar energy.  However, this outcome was fully consistent 
with basic public choice theory:  highly regulated entities, like APS, are 
permitted to fund campaigns for their own rent-generating proposals and 
tend to have sizable advantages over the general public in the political 
process.116  APS had much to gain from commission approval of its proposal, 
which gave the utility a new revenue stream.  In contrast, the costs associated 
with the proposal will be diffusely spread among thousands of APS customers 
who favored solar energy-friendly policies but faced collective action 
problems in banding together to oppose this sort of measure. 
From the early beginning of the regulated utility model, commentators 
have similarly warned of its vulnerability to “regulatory capture.” 117  
Regulatory capture occurs when a well-organized group or entity exerts 
influence over government legislative or regulatory processes to advance 
 
 115.  See Nichola Groom, Arizona sets precedent for solar systems with monthly fee, 
CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 14, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-11-14/news/sns-rt-us-
solar-arizona-20131114_1_net-metering-solar-customers-aps (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 116.  See Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 77, 
90 (2009) (“Government institutions . . . are prone to capture by special interests that have 
an incentive to obtain concentrated benefits by imposing diffuse costs on the general 
public.  There is thus a depressing tendency for institutions, programs, and laws designed 
to regulate particular industries to become captured by those very same groups, which then 
modify the law over time for their own benefit regardless of the costs to the public or other 
interests”). 
 117.  See William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. 
REV. 1614, 1635 (2014) (“[E]arly proponents of public utility were well aware of the 
problems manifest in the actual practice of utility regulation. They recognized that rent 
seeking, regulatory capture, and overinvestment posed important challenges to the success 
of public utility regulation”). 
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its own interests at the expense of the general public.118  The risk of regulatory 
capture is heightened in contexts where a regulated entity has repeated 
and prolonged interactions with a specialized regulating body.119  Utility 
regulation perfectly fits this description since utilities’ fortunes are heavily 
dependent upon succeeding in their repeated interactions with the state 
public utility commissions. 
In many states, public utility commissions are comprised of only a small 
handful of commissioners, each wielding significant influence over the 
regulation of utilities within the state.  Facing the threat of distributed solar 
energy—a disruptive innovation that could undercut utility profits in the 
short run and radically transform the entire electricity industry in the long 
run—utilities increasingly have much at stake in these elections.  The 
political leanings of public utility commissioners can matter a lot to utilities 
that are seeking reforms to net metering or rate designs in response to 
distributed energy growth. 
Given the growing importance of public utility commissions to the 
financial well-being of utilities in this new era of distributed solar energy, 
it is thus hardly surprising to see possible signs of regulatory capture as 
utilities increasingly lean on the state regulatory system to shield them from 
the market impacts of distributed solar energy.  For instance, APS recently 
drew attention for allegedly contributing large sums of money to indirectly 
aid the election campaigns of public utility commissioner candidates and 
an attorney general candidate in Arizona.120  Such “dark money” funding 
 
 118.  See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, 
and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1340 (2013) (“Capture describes situations 
where organized interest groups successfully act to vindicate their goals through 
government policy at the expense of the public interest”). 
 119.  See id. (“For groups that are repeat players before specialized agencies, 
investments in long-term relationships can have substantial returns in terms of influence, 
raising capture concerns.”). 
 120.  Multiple news articles have mentioned that APS was widely suspected to have 
given heavy financial backing to Arizona Corporation Commission candidates Tom 
Forese and Doug Little and to Arizona attorney general candidate Mark Brnovich in the 
states’ 2014 midterm elections.  See, e.g., Mike Sunnucks, APS- Backed Republicans take 
ACC seats, AG’s office, PHOENIX BUS. J. (Nov. 4, 2014, 9:43 PM MST), http://www. 
bizjournals.com/phoenix/news/2014/11/04/aps-backed-republicans-take-acc-seats-doing-
well.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (“Arizona Public Service Co . and its parent 
company. . .were big backers of Republicans Tom Forese and Doug Little, who won the 
race for two Arizona Corporation Commission seats); Ryan Randazzo, Republicans 
Forese, Little win Arizona Corporation Commission race, AZCENTRAL.COM (Nov. 4, 
2014, 9:40 PM MST), http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/2014/11/04/arizona- 
corporation-commission-election-night/18427899/ (“APS is widely believed to have contributed 
to the independent groups that supported Forese and Little and ran $1.3 million in negative 
ads against Democrat Sandra Kennedy as well as primary opponents of Forese and 
Little.”); Laurie Roberts, Secret campaign to elect Forese/Little nears $1 million, 
AZCENTRAL.COM (Aug. 2, 2014, 1:43 PM MST), http://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/op-
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strategies, which are supposedly permissible under certain conditions after 
the Supreme Court’s famed Citizens United decision,121 seemed to pay off 
for APS in this instance:  all three of the candidates that purportedly 
benefited from indirect APS financial contributions ultimately won their 
election bids.122  In the week leading up to the election, one local newspaper 
columnist reporting on the issue questioned: 
Is APS trying to buy not only the commission that regulates it but all the big state 
offices? Is APS making a secret bid to essentially run this state using money 
supplied by you and me when we pay our electric bill?123 
Some might characterize it as “unfair” for heavily-regulated utilities to 
indirectly contribute large sums of money toward the election campaigns 
of the state officials who regulate them.124  However, it seems more 
fruitful to disregard notions of fairness when examining such activities 
and analyze them instead under principles of welfare economics and 
public choice theory.  In that light, the hazards of allowing this practice 
are plain to see.  Heavily regulated utilities—including investor-owned 
utilities—are primarily intended to serve the public.125  Such highly regulated 
 
ed/laurieroberts/2014/08/01/corporation-commission-dark-money-race/13493677/ (“Save 
Our Future Now and the Arizona Free Enterprise Club are both widely suspected in the 
political community of being front groups for Arizona Public Service” and that “the two 
groups ha[d] spent a jaw dropping $885,000 in their independent campaign to try to get 
Forese and Little onto the Corporation Commission”). 
 121.  See generally Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
See also John P. Sarbanes & Raymond O’ Mara III, Foreword, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
1, 14 (Winter 2014) explaining that the “entrance of “Super PACs” and “dark money” 
outside spenders” was “made possible by Citizens United and subsequent lower court 
rulings”). 
 122.  See Sunnucks, supra note 120. 
 123.  Laurie Roberts, Who is secretly spending $15 million to win your vote?, 
AZCENTRAL.COM  (Oct. 29, 2014, 11:19 AM MST), http://www.azcentral.com/story/laurie 
roberts/2014/10/29/dark-money-spending-in-arizona-tops-15-million/18081207/. 
 124.  For example, a bill was recently introduced in Congress entitled the “Fair 
Elections Now Act” that sought to promote more “fair” elections by subsidizing certain 
types of private campaign contributions through matching rules with a goal of helping 
candidates to compete on a more equal playing field.  See generally Fair Elections Now 
Act, S. 1285, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-
s1285/text.  Likewise, an agency in California with the term “fair” in its name—the Fair 
Political Practices Commission—regulates election fundraising activities in that state. 
CALIFORNIA’S FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMMISSION AND ITS RESPONSIBILITIES, 
available at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/index.php?id=2 (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 125.  See Nicole Fox, et al., CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM: PUBLIC UTILITIES, 73B C.J.S. 
PUBLIC UTILITIES § 13 (2014) (“The theory behind the regulation of public utilities is the 
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entities should not be permitted to exert heavy influence over the political 
process in matters that directly and substantially affect them.  Legal rules 
that neglect to limit the influence of heavily regulated bodies in these 
political activities substantially increase the risk of costly regulatory 
capture problems like those highlighted above.126 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
If the past decade’s dramatic growth is any indication, rooftop solar 
energy and other distributed energy technologies are poised to drastically 
transform the electricity industry in the coming century.  Given the nation’s 
heavy reliance on electricity, there is much to be gained from ensuring 
that this is a smooth and efficient transformation.  Many of the policy 
challenges associated with this transition remain unresolved and significant 
uncertainty lies ahead.  Academics and policymakers are only beginning 
to grapple with the difficulties that will face the electricity sector as it 
wades through this historic shift toward cleaner and more distributed 
energy sources.  However, one thing seems reasonably clear: descriptive, 
straightforward debate that is free from fairness rhetoric is more likely to 
lead decision-makers to the ideas and policies necessary to support a 
sustainable energy future. 
 
 
protection of the public and the assurance of adequate service on one hand, and on the 
other, a fair opportunity to the utility to secure, by business economy, a reasonable return 
from such services, but the primary purpose is to serve the interests of the public and not 
to establish a monopoly or to guarantee the security of investment in a public utility”). 
 126.  See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. 
